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External statebuilders have been notoriously bad at making sense of the historical 
experiences and trajectories of state-society relations. As such, there is often the working 
assumption that externally-driven post-conflict statebuilding is substantially changing the 
dynamics of rule in a polity through the import of liberal ideas. Yet in practice this is often 
not the case. This chapter looks at three successive attempts at statebuilding in Mozambique 
and draws out interesting elements of continuity between them in terms of political 
authority, political economy and public administration practices. These are the colonial New 
State from 1930-1974, the socialist post-independence state from 1975-1989, and the liberal 
post-conflict restructuring from 1990 onwards. The discussion concludes that internal and 
external elites’ unwillingness to address or re-structure some fundamental relationships 
between the state and the population sustains the tensions generated by strategies for 
political rule and development. This is especially evident where ‘liberal’ statebuilding 
practices have tended to have distinctively ‘conservative’ effects in terms of state-society 





External statebuilders have been notoriously bad at making sense of the historical 
experiences and trajectories of state-society relations. As such, there is often the working 
assumption that externally-driven post-conflict statebuilding is substantially changing the 
dynamics of rule in a polity through the import of liberal ideas. Yet, very often, this does not 
seem to be the case. Recent academic literature on statebuilding has moved towards a more 
‘sociological’ analysis of the state based on the classic approaches of Weber and Durkheim to 
the phenomenon of statehood (see chapter 1, this volume). This important turn flags up the 
dangers of attempting to import authority and legitimacy in a hurry and without relevant 
institutions. However, there is also a need to reflect on the historic patterns of establishing 
rule and authority in particular places. Such an analysis, grounded in an alternative analytic 
sensibility around the historic objectives of statebuilding in the global South (see Mamdani 
1996, Scott 1998), raises deep questions about the idea of “state failure”, the nature and 
politics of statebuilding, the values and objectives it supports and the tensions that it tries to 
overcome.  
 
This chapter looks briefly at three successive attempts at statebuilding in 
Mozambique and draws out interesting elements of continuity between them in terms of 
political authority, political economy and public administration practices. These are the 
colonial New State from 1930-1974, the socialist post-independence state from 1975-1989, and 
the liberal post-conflict restructuring from 1990 onwards. Mozambique has counted among 
one of the major early ‘success stories’ of post-conflict peacebuilding in that it brought 
formerly warring parties into a generally peaceful and regular electoral cycle, its central 
government has expanded its provision of public services and it has had high year-on-year 
economic growth since the end of the war in the early 1990s. Yet it is also the case that the 
attempted ‘liberal’ statebuilding practices have tended to have distinctively ‘conservative’ 
effects in terms of state-society relations, often reproducing rather than transforming power 
and authority. The chapter will focus on three central themes: political authority, political 
economy and public administration. These are dimensions of statebuilding which overlap 
and have tended to mutually reinforce one another. The discussion will trace approaches to 
statebuilding in each period before analysing them together.  
 
Colonial statebuilding: the New State (Novo Estado), 1930-74 
 
Portugal had been embarrassed at the Berlin Conference of 1889. Its ambitions to be 
equal to other European imperial powers in Africa were threatened by its lack of control 
over the territories to which it laid claim. Powerful African groups fought back, the slave 
trade was still present and the concession companies were disorganised and unproductive 
(Vail and White 1980: 200-230). Proposals were made to have the colonies taken over by 
Britain or Germany, which Portugal resisted. The fascist dictatorship which emerged in 
1926, soon developed the project of the New State (Novo Estado) to consolidate the chaotic 
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administration of the First Republic in Portugal, and to consolidate imperial rule abroad. 
These were articulated in the Colonial Act (1930) and the Organic Charter (1933).1 These two 
acts laid the foundation for the first modern ‘statebuilding’ project across the entire territory 
of what is now bordered as Mozambique, consolidating it as a single political entity 
incorporated into Portugal. 
 
The Organic Charter re-designed colonial public administration within Mozambique, 
emulating strategies of Native Administration elsewhere (see Mamdani 1996). Colonial 
Companies were disbanded, and passed into the control of the state, which installed state 
Administrative Posts throughout the country. The territory was marked out into around 100 
administrative divisions, which sometimes followed the boundaries of the old concession 
company territories.   The enforcers of the colonial companies – the cipais (i.e. sepoys) – were 
recruited instead by the state directly as native police. Another layer of Native 
Administration was created via régulos; these were ‘traditional leaders’ whom the state 
recognised as intermediaries for rural populations, and who raised the Portuguese flag. This 
was critical in terms of expanding the state’s visibility, surveillance practices and economic 
reach over the population as a whole. 
 
 Also codified in the Organic Charter was the indígenato system, formalising a racial 
division between subject ‘native’ indígenas and citizen ‘non-natives’ in law and the political 
economy. ‘Citizens’ could own property, move freely, participate in various public 
institutions and had no labour obligations. ‘Natives’ on the other hand were excluded from 
colonial social and political life, taxed heavily and compelled to offer ‘contract’ – essentially 
forced – labour (called chibalo) (O’Laughlin 2000).  Within this, a category of the ‘assimilated’ 
(assimilados) was also created. These would be those natives who had sufficiently ‘advanced’ 
in their adoption of European culture, religion and language to be treated under the same 
legal codes. These assimilados were crucial in Portugal’s attempt to buttress and legitimise its 
political authority in the colonies as leading a civilising multi-racial lusophone community. 
 
The same Charter established an autarchic imperial economy in which colonies 
would supply foreign exchange, taxes and raw materials for industrialisation in Portugal, 
such as cotton, sugar and copra. As discussed by Isaacman (1995), these practices often led 
to widespread malnutrition amongst the peasantry. Yet for the colonial authority, these were 
justified as necessary for the ‘development’ of the colony and imperial system overall. 
However, chibalo and famine accelerated economic migration into the South African mines, 
where wages were higher and conditions slightly better. 
 
The colonial statebuilding project in Mozambique under the New State was thus 
radical and ambitious – establishing a national centralised bureaucratic authority and 
                                                 
1 For more details on the reforms, see Newitt (1995), chapters 15 to 17. 
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decentralised forms of public administration, patterns of agricultural production and cheap 
labour export, and a civilising, developmentalist rationale for the colonial state. This 
statebuilding project aimed, largely successfully, to concentrate administrative capacity and 
power in the hands of a relatively small group of people loyal to the colonial state. This same 
group also largely controlled the export-oriented political economy. Overall, its aims were to 
pacify and profit from the peoples and territories within Mozambique through the 
apparatus of a bureaucratic state, which was visible, centralised and planned. Yet both its 
methods of rule and distributive outcomes were widely unpopular. The next section will 
explore the attempt to overturn these in the period after independence.  
 
Socialism and post-independence statebuilding 1975-1989 
 
 Independence was hard fought in Mozambique, eventually coming in 1975 following 
a coup in Lisbon. Decolonisation was both unexpected and rapid, leading to a near collapse 
of state functions. State power was handed over to the Frelimo2 movement that had been 
fighting an anti-colonial guerrilla war, who had to find ways of building up state functions, 
authority and capacity from a low baseline. Much of the human capital, in the sense of 
people with secondary education and administrative experience, had left the country. 
Although sympathetic cooperantes from other countries were sometimes used to fill these 
positions, they did not always match the vacancies. During the first years following 
independence, those with any training at all worked in several posts simultaneously. This 
was especially the case in education and healthcare, which the government was keen to 
rapidly expand, to develop the country and cement its authority. 
 
In response to this context, and a radical turn in the movement, Frelimo moved in 
1977 to establish a socialist one-party state and a series of revolutionary reforms. The aim of 
the Party was to dismantle colonial power and institute forms of collective modernisation 
and development. The old racialised divisions of the colonial state were to be replaced by a 
Homem Novo (New Man) ideal of citizenship based on scientific socialism, literacy, equality, 
and the rejection of superstition (Mosca 1999). Frelimo also set about creating political 
structures throughout the country to connect with the population. A hierarchical network of 
Party cells, based on colonial administrative divisions, became the engine for the spread of 
its influence, which also became highly fused with the structures of local state 
administration.  
 
In principle, these sought to be inclusive, participatory and democratic in deliberative 
and decision-making structures.  As such, this marked in theory a substantial departure 
from colonial rule. However in many places, these reproduced and connected with existing 
                                                 
2 Frente de Libertação de Moçambique./Mozambique Liberation Front 
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forms of social authority (Harrison 2000). Yet elsewhere, these new structures disrupted 
authority – for example, allowing populations the space to humiliate and marginalise régulos 
who had collaborated more enthusiastically with the colonial state.  The party also sought to 
embed itself deeply into the state bureaucracy, particularly under the charismatic 
authoritarianism of President Samora Machel. He was convinced that the vestiges of the 
colonial bureaucracy were reactionary, and sought to undermine them as an independent 
force (Egerö 1987). Thus the Party was a primary shaper of public administration and 
political life at both a central and local level, based on a combination of inclusion and 
hierarchical order. 
 
The state also needed to reconstruct an economic basis for its existence, which it did 
through an ambitious programme of state intervention in the economy. In terms of physical 
capital, at independence assets had been stripped, booby-trapped or destroyed to prevent 
further use. Trading networks and shops closed down. The government’s programme of 
rapid nationalisation of industries and shop networks was a logical reaction to this collapse 
(Pitcher 2002: 38-9; Hanlon 1984). Simultaneously, the new government attempted to 
industrialise rapidly and extensively imported heavy machinery from both the West and 
Eastern bloc countries, although few people knew how to use or maintain it. In terms of the 
rural economy, the government promoted the development of gigantic state farms and co-
operatives which peasants were encouraged – and sometimes compelled – to work at or join, 
often producing the same crops as under colonialism. In the first few years of independence 
these measures collectively resulted in appreciable economic growth, although by the early 
1980s many had failed through poor design, drought, armed sabotage (as discussed below) 
or simple overambition. It was also increasingly difficult to import food. Due to Frelimo 
support for the ANC, Mozambique lost much of the foreign exchange its workers earned in 
South African mines. Due to the imports and the loss of foreign exchange, Mozambique 
went quickly from having virtually no foreign debt in 1980 to becoming very heavily 
indebted by 1984.  
 
Overall, then, the post-independence statebuilding project sought explicitly to be 
revolutionary and to overturn colonial rule through new ideas for political authority, public 
administration and the political economy. Yet, despite these radical ambitions, there were 
often striking continuities with dynamics of hierarchy in social relations. Marshall (1993) 
argues for example that literacy programmes in factories tended to reinforce structures of 
authority in management and social class, make onerous, unpaid demands on workers’ time 
and reinforce the status of Portuguese as the language of political participation. As such, 
literacy programmes – at the heart of the government’s vision for a modern, empowered, 
developed population – often ended up producing or reproducing forms of alienation 
between the ruling elites and masses. Other elements of the government’s new programme 
such as the creation of communal villages, co-operatives and collective production showed 
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similar tendencies, often including physical compulsion, creating tensions between state and 
peasantry (Bowen 2000).  
 
The biggest threat to post-independence statebuilding was however Renamo’s 
deliberate and widespread programme of state destruction.3 It is broadly agreed that the 
group came about when the Rhodesian security services (and after 1980 the South African 
security services) extensively funded, trained and supported a group of disgruntled ex-
Frelimo to deliberately destabilise the new Frelimo regime (Vines 1995, Manning 2002, 
Cabrita 2000). At later stages, support was received from right-wing groups within the 
United States and Europe as part of Cold War anti-communist infiltration.  
 
Renamo deliberately targeted infrastructure such as roads and railway lines, 
particularly those linking Southern Rhodesia to Mozambique in the Beira corridor and those 
supplying productive industries, as well as any symbols of state power, including 
communal villages, health and education posts, and the bureaucratic apparatus (Young 
1990). The impact of these attacks was pervasive and substantial, both through damage 
caused and reduced activity due to fear amongst civilians. Various eyewitness accounts 
testify strongly to the brutality of the war, which produced displacement of up to four 
million and caused hundreds of thousands of deaths and mutilations (Magaia 1988, 
Nordstrom 1997). Yet despite the seemingly senseless character of the atrocities, in places 
Renamo did come to a modus vivendi with populations through tapping resistance to 
Frelimo’s statebuilding programme (Geffray 1990, Hall 1990). In this sense, the outcome of 
Renamo’s violence exactly cohered with its intentions – to destabilise the state and make 
normal life unviable, and to challenge Frelimo’s attempts at ‘modernist’ social 
transformation and thus the establishment of its political legitimacy. 
 
The fifteen years after decolonisation thus saw Mozambique’s second ambitious 
statebuilding project in the twentieth century, based in the attempt to push the territory and 
population along a socialist developmental pathway away from colonialism. To a certain 
extent there were very important changes and successes, such as a halving of illiteracy, and 
indeed the fact of political independence.  Yet, as will be discussed further below, elements 
of the statebuilding programme reproduced some of the same antagonistic dynamics and 
distributions of power that had caused resistance to the colonial order, which Renamo fed 
off during its sabotage campaign. The next section will explore how the turn to a liberal 
statebuilding agenda in the 1980s onwards may only have minimally disturbed some of 
these antagonistic dynamics.  
 
                                                 
3 Resistência Nacional Moçambicano – Mozambican National Resistance.  
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Liberalisation and post-war statebuilding, 1989-present 
 
Although elements of liberalisation were put in place from the 1980s, it was from the 
1990s onwards that a third and largely ‘liberal’ post-war programme of statebuilding in 
Mozambique was undertaken, under the close watch of the IFIs and European donors who 
exerted considerable influence (see Hanlon 1996). The guiding principles for these reforms 
were economic and political liberalisation, technical assistance, renewed framings for 
development policy, good governance and capacity building. In design, these principles 
were intended to remake the relationship between state and citizenry along liberal and 
democratic lines, and thus reduce violence.  
 
On the political front, the move to multi-party elections and the funding of Renamo 
as a political party was enough to secure a peace deal, backed by solid financing for the talks 
and for demobilisation programmes from the UN and Italian Government. The Government 
of Mozambique had anticipated this by changing the Constitution accordingly in 1989 
(Munslow 1990, Hall and Young 1991, Mendes 1994). There were a series of delays in setting 
up an acceptable National Electoral Commission and process but elections were finally held 
in 1994. Subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections have been held regularly, if not 
always smoothly, every five years.   Under lobbying from the Mozambican journalist 
community, the press and broadcast media was also increasingly liberalised (Jone 2005) in 
the post-war period. Various small and not-so-small scale civil society organisations have 
also emerged with the help of international sponsorship. As such, the public arena itself is 
visibly wider and less coercive than under the post-independence regime. 
 
 The macroeconomic liberalisation programme that had begun in the 1980s with the 
IMF, progressively removing state intervention from the economy, also continued in the 
1990s. In 1984, the government approved a structural adjustment programme in return for 
debt rescheduling. Official co-operation with the World Bank and EEC under the Lomé 
Convention also began. This assistance was conditional on measures such the removal of 
prices of production inputs and exchange controls on the currency, but developed into much 
wider programmes of privatisation, subsidy withdrawal and divestiture in the 1990s. 
Famously, several industries such as the cashew industry suffered heavy losses of jobs and 
profits following the withdrawal of state pricing and exposure to competition from 
subsidised markets elsewhere (see Cramer 1999). This project in particular led to substantial 
backtracking. Elsewhere however, public spending has been deeply curtailed.  
 
Another round of debt cancellation occurred in 1999 under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative, where Mozambique had most of its outstanding debt cancelled in 
return for adherence to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) agreed with Western 
donors, particularly the World Bank. These PRSPs upheld central elements of structural 
8 
 
adjustment but also included an emphasis on Millennium Development Goals indicators 
such as numbers living on less than $1 per day and access to public services. These papers 
continue to form a central part of the negotiating framework for future budget support for 
the government and thus are an ongoing constraint on state action in the present.  
 
In order to undertake these reforms and restructure state institutions, central and 
local government also received substantial forms of ‘technical assistance’, either in terms of 
donor agency employees seconded from embassies or people contracted as consultants, as 
part of the ‘capacity building’ and ‘knowledge transfer’ agenda. This was often the only 
option available for ministries, whose capacity to pay civil servant salaries was limited. A 
few were long-term appointments, but the majority carried out short-term analysis or 
restructuring projects, often around planning and budget capabilities. Increasingly, there 
developed ‘revolving doors’ between ministries, consultancies and donor agencies, as the 
latter hired talented Mozambican nationals out of ministries. As such, it is fair to say that 
any improvements in public administration in this period were uneven and often short-
lived, subject to a range of competing interests and agendas.  
 
Beyond interventions in the organs of the state, there was a large influx of aid which 
was administered directly to the population by external groups. These included (mostly 
European and North American) bilateral aid agencies, multilateral aid agencies and NGOs, 
carrying out a massive range of humanitarian and developmental missions, often setting up 
parallel structures to those of the state and in competition with each other. By 1989, the 
population was heavily reliant on food aid from donors, and by 1994, foreign aid overall 
counted for 60% of Gross National Income (Batley 2005: 417). In recent years this has 
substantially reduced, and increasing quantities go directly to central government as part of 
the statebuilding agenda. However, overall it still constitutes just under half of the 
government’s budget.  
 
  The liberal statebuilding project undertaken during and after the war thus, like its 
predecessors, attempted to radically re-shape state functions and the state-society 
relationship through an alternative vision of the role of the state in society, which combined 
liberal ideas about the state-society relationship with a New Public Management (i.e. pro-
market and outsourcing) approach to public administration. In areas, such as the push for 
political freedoms and macroeconomic liberalisation, it has broadly succeeded in its aims.  
Yet, just as each new regime attempts to define itself against the failures of previous 
regimes, each statebuilding project has also reproduced or only slightly modified some 
broad contours of rule in Mozambique. The next section offers some assessment of the 
various changes and continuities in three dimensions of statehood; political authority, 




Continuities and changes in statebuilding, 1930-present 
i. Political authority 
 
To discuss the sources of political authority in statebuilding projects is to discuss 
how regimes claim their right to rule and legitimise the choices made on behalf of subjects. It 
is of significance that in Mozambique across all three statebuilding projects discussed, 
political authority has been continuously constituted and re-constituted through ideologies 
of ‘development’, resting on a diagnostic of Mozambican ‘underdevelopment’. It is also of 
significance that political authority has had to reconstitute itself in response to resistance by 
trying to liberalise or co-opting dissenting voices.  
 
For the colonial regime, there was a combination of ideas of moral and spiritual 
development through the Catholic Church, coupled with the ‘progressive’ political and 
economic effects of colonialism on backward races. These provided an overall rationale for 
the colonial state, and justifications for particularly strong exercises of its power in forcing 
labour towards ‘public works’. For Frelimo after independence, the core critique of 
colonialism was that it had led to underdevelopment and backwardness in Mozambique, 
thus requiring a very widescale programme of social, political and economic change, to be 
advised by those sufficiently knowledgeable and educated within the regime. Mahoney 
(2003) has commented in particular on the similarities between the colonial ‘New State’ and 
Frelimo’s ‘New Man’ authoritarian and modernising developmental ideologies. Both 
regimes used this justification to also exercise tight control over political institutions and the 
political economy.  
 
In the period since the end of the war, the goal of pursuing ‘development’ continues 
to provide political authority with its central justification, both for the state and for donor 
interventions.  This has reinforced and maintained the basic didactic hierarchies established 
by development, and in particular has facilitated the concentration of political decision 
making into the hands of development experts and officials.4 The integration of Millennium 
Development Goals and other markers of ‘development’ into statebuilding is not however a 
rupture from the basic rationale of the state. Unsurprisingly, the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers, a primary instrument of liberalisation interventions, are tied to the authority of 
development actors, as well as required to show ‘developmental’ outcomes such as 
reductions in absolute poverty. As with the previous regimes, however, the designation of 
what is developmentally necessary has effectively closed off political contestation and 
reinforced the power of state actors vis-à-vis the population. Mkandawire (1999) has called 
such states ‘choiceless democracies’. Moreover, although aspects of ideology such as the 
necessity of state intervention have apparently changed, others have not. For example, 
                                                 
4 See Ferguson (1990) for the most famous account of these dynamics. 
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contemporary agricultural interventions continue to presume the undifferentiated 
subsistence character of a smallholder peasantry (Cramer 2006:  261-2, Duffield 2007: chapter 
4). 
 
The stability of developmental political authority, enduring as it is, has often had to 
make liberalising moves to ward off dissenters. For example, the colonial regime was forced 
in the 1960s to permit various kinds of reform to try to stay in power, such as the nominal 
abolitions of the indígena category and of chibalo. Equally, Frelimo was required from the late 
1980s to allow forms of political and economic liberalisation to contain the internal (Renamo) 
and external (donor) forces of opposition. Since the end of the war, the transition from the 
Chissano to the Guebuza government can also be seen as another such form of 
retrenchment, following a nearly-lost 1999 Presidential election (Sumich 2007). In 
substantive terms, however, none of these retrenchments resulted in forms of change within 
the core personnel of the regime, nor their ability to exercise power through the state.  
 
Indeed, only two small elites have wielded state power since 1930. Yet on the surface 
these liberalisations seemed to be signs of substantive political change; indeed, the feting of 
both the regularity of elections and Chissano’s ‘voluntary’ step-down have been seen to be 
signs of the health of Mozambique’s democracy. Overall however, in all cases, we have seen 
periodic returns to the centralisation of power. Currently, this is based in a reassertion of the 
Party within institutions of the state and a reinvigoration of Party structures as 
organisational vehicles.  
 
ii. Political economy 
 
The persisting centrality of the state elite is made clearer when we consider the 
political economic relationship between the state and large companies in recent years. 
Reading off critiques of liberal statebuilding, we would expect the enforced liberalisation 
and privatisation of state enterprises to constitute a radical departure from forms of prior 
ownership. Pitcher (1996, 2002) has however analysed particular elements which suggest 
some continuities on the basic ground of co-operation between the state and large 
enterprises.  
 
The colonial state, as mentioned, sought first to operate through large colonial 
companies, before taking them over directly as instruments of the state under the New State. 
This was to secure monopolistic control of production which propped up the state and its 
export-oriented political economy. The post-independence government’s policy was 
essentially one of continuation with this structure of ownership, in terms of investment 
coming from the state and profits being returned to the state. Whilst the state itself was 
much more oriented towards the needs of the population than the colonial regime, there 
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were nonetheless continuities in the mutually supportive relationship between the state and 
large enterprise, which operated monopolistically.  
 
Today, the processes of privatisation and liberalisation that have taken place in the 
post-independence period have largely transformed state monopolies into private 
monopolies or oligopolies across a range of sectors. Although nominally ‘private’, almost all 
large enterprises now must have a fairly direct relationship with the regime via either the 
state, or via commercial partnership with members of the Frelimo nomenklatura. Thus, for 
example, the President controls large stakes in the ‘privatised’ public utilities sector, the 
former President has significant interests in mining, and even the party itself has an 
investment arm (Hanlon 2009). Investment laws require foreign investors to partner with a 
national investor, who is usually connected with the Party somehow. This is more obviously 
true of the so-called ‘mega-projects’, such as Mozal (Mozambique Aluminium) which are 
half-owned by foreign investors and half-owned by the state. Monopolistic structures of 
industry also persist in many markets; although legally permitted, competition between the 
companies of the state-elite is generally minimal.  
 
As Pitcher argues, this signals that privatisation in Mozambique has not been the 
wholesale re-orientation of public enterprise towards the private sector, but has contended 
with and reinforced structures of political power. The recent re-emergence of colonial-era 
companies such as Sena Sugar Estates – this time co-owned by the state and Mauritian 
investors, and backed by World Bank guarantees rather than the colonial state – is perhaps a 
more obvious reminder of such continuities (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
2011). These continuities may be particularly obvious to rural populations, some of whom 
have endured compulsory land evictions under all three regimes to serve large plantation 
agriculture.  
 
These large estates can also shape opportunities for wage labour in the central 
provinces where many operate, which often represent generational continuities for workers 
and their families. Although this is now not chibalo nor war labour, and workers are entitled 
to various minimum wages, these wages are often inadequate and very strongly eroded by 
inflation. Such generational continuities are also obvious in the ongoing patterns of migrant 
labour to South Africa from the southern provinces, cash-cropping in the northern 
provinces, and the structure of Mozambican Indian ownership of businesses across the 
country.  
 
These forms of continuity – close collaboration between the state elite and large 
enterprises, geographical patterns of wage labour and income generation, and the role of the 
Indian merchant community – are indications of the extent to which liberal statebuilding has 
reproduced the broad structures of the political economy under the colonial and socialist 
regimes. There are important additives to this, including the influx of development aid, 
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although often the distribution and effects of that money remain limited to the development 
industry in the capital city. Overall however, the national political economy remains shaped 
by a concentration of ownership in small elites and an extraverted and export-oriented 
approach to rural development and regional traditions of income generation. This continuity 
strongly interacts with the developmental basis of political authority, which can allow the 
state to defer responsibility for the lack of change in economic conditions whilst also 
reinforcing the need for top-down direction.5  
 
iii. Public administration 
 
 Public administration practices have also shown interesting forms of continuity as 
well as change. Critical accounts of statebuilding have emphasised that neoliberal policies 
have served to ‘hollow out’ the state, making it simply a regulatory agency rather than a 
substantive distributor and arbiter of political goods (Chandler 2010). Intuitively, the claim 
seems plausible, and fits with the general story about the character of contemporary 
statebuilding.  
 
However, the actual practices of public administration seem to have worked in some 
contrary ways. For example, both the colonial state and socialist state were marked by 
substantial planning architectures in order to integrate the political reach of the state with 
the desired economic outcomes concerning production and autarchy. Salazar’s Five Year 
Plan for Mozambique and Machel’s Ten Year (later Five Year) Plans for addressing 
developmental problems were thus a significant feature of their regimes. One would expect 
that liberalisation would thus reduce the size and scope of national planning architectures as 
the country was moved away from a planned economy.  
 
Yet, the opposite seems to have happened; planning architectures and processes 
within Mozambique are now, perhaps more than ever, the central activity of politics and 
political life, across not just the state but public organisations and agencies. For example, the 
government continues to present its Five Year Plan (Plano Quinquenial do Governo), which is 
now the apparent basis for the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA), 
which fulfils PRSP planning requirements. Each sector is also required to develop a Sector –
Wide Action Plan (SWAP), with implementing agencies also required to produce strategic 
plans at the level of the organisation. Local governments, and now even administrative 
districts have multiple regular planning exercises.  
 
These plans are important because their negotiation is an interface of visibility 
between government and donors, and perhaps because they represent a concrete output of 
                                                 
5 See arguments in Chandler (2006) about statebuilding and political responsibility. 
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co-operation. Although what is planned has to a substantial extent altered, from production 
targets to development targets, the bureaucratic practice and culture of planning has not 
diminished per se. Indeed, the establishment of a more powerful planning ministry in 
Mozambique – the Ministry for Planning and Development – indicates the centrality of this 
activity to the state, as well as reflects the increasing desire of the Mozambican state to have 
as much influence over the outcome of planning processes as possible.6  
 
 Another policy of liberal administration is ‘decentralised’ governance, which is 
articulated as countering the dysfunctional, centralised bureaucratic post-colonial state. Yet, 
as West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999) have showed, these efforts have in places been greeted 
and treated as, variously, the re-invigoration of the colonial régulo system, the re-
appointment of Frelimo Party representatives, the re-recognition of Renamo mambo 
representatives, or as the recognition of other traditions of decentralised authority. Some of 
the former régulos who have been involved have requested to have powers over local 
taxation and labour returned, as well as uniforms, flags and transport with which to project 
their authority. This indicates that decentralisation practices have been received as resonant 
with earlier forms of Native Administration and Party organisation. Nor is this necessarily a 
misperception.  For example, in the recent presidential campaigns for example, many 
complained that decentralised budgets were being diverted towards the projects of people 
affiliated with the Frelimo Party or their relatives (Langa 2011, Serra 2009). The local 
distribution of power and goods in this sense functions to ensure the longevity of the 
regime’s project, as did previous systems.  
 
 Third, beyond planning and decentralisation, there are even resonances in the 
resurrection of the ‘villagisation’ idea via the Millennium Development Villages constructed 
recently. One in Gaza province, was opened by Jeffrey Sachs, who arrived with 500 
mosquito nets, a plough and four yokes (AIM, 2006). In the colonial era, the peasantry were 
herded into ‘aldeamentos’ (villages) to keep them separated from the rebels. These promised 
access to water and other infrastructure within the context of counter-insurgency (Jundanian 
1974). Frelimo essentially repeated the strategy with the aldeias commnuais, which served 
security functions during the Renamo conflict as well as developmental ones. These are not 
remembered particularly fondly either.  Clearly, in the present day, there is a far lesser 
threat of widespread violence from either the state or an insurgency, and the population is 
not physically compelled to remain there. These are important differences. What is 
interesting however is the continuity in the administrative imagination, which gives rise to 
                                                 




the enduring appeal of the model village as a vehicle for progress, development and better 
administration.7  
 
This historical reading of statebuilding practice suggests that there is much in the 
way of continuity in the state-society relationships established, including in the discourses 
that govern political authority and legitimise the state, the ownership and orientation of the 
political economy, and the modalities and personnel in public administration. Clearly, this 
does not indicate that nothing has changed. As noted in this section, important changes 
include the diminution of widespread physical violence, compulsory free labour and the 
shift away from economic autarchy, which are important features both of everyday life and 
in the relationships between state and society. Yet these are not by and large as central to 
forms of rule as some of the elements discussed, which pertain to the issues concerning the 
claiming, distribution and structuring of political power, wealth and control.  The 
conclusion will reflect on the significance of this for how scholars, practitioners and citizens 
might approach the issue of statebuilding.  
 
Conclusions: why we must think historically about statebuilding  
 
The history of statebuilding in Mozambique shows that this is not a recent 
phenomenon driven by novel policy but a repeated phenomenon, with variations, 
incorporated into structures of global modernity. As the chapter has argued, although 
different regimes appear to institute radical change, dynamics of political authority, political 
economy and public administration also continue and substantially repeat previous 
strategies of rule.  
 
This is crucial to remember on many levels. From the perspective of external 
practitioners, this puts into perspective the non-novel character of many contemporary 
interventions, and might even encourage a close examination of previous failures. For 
example, current donor agricultural policy in Mozambique is based on support for co-
operatives with no substantive account of why they previously failed in this context. For 
scholars, both critical and supportive, this should encourage deeper reflection on the status, 
effectiveness and logic of contemporary statebuilding, which has often been held up as 
‘liberal’ or ‘neoliberal’ in character. Looking at the problem historically suggests dynamics of 
statebuilding are embedded substantially in particular dynamics which long pre-date the 
last twenty years. For citizens, historical awareness and consciousness of former 
statebuilding strategies offers a terrain for reflection on the present, as many in Mozambique 
have already recognised around the issue of state corruption.  
                                                 
7 Scott’s discussion (1998, chapter 7) of the functions served by villagisation in Tanzania as providing 




Duffield has argued that post-war liberal intervention represents a ‘radical 
developmental agenda of social transformation’ (2001: 10-11). However, at least for 
Mozambique, this is to obscure the very anti-radical, socially and politically conservative 
dimensions of its effects on structures of power, wealth and authority in the country. From a 
perspective which uses history as a counterpoint, reforms have allowed for an entrenchment 
of power and modalities of rule, whilst appearing to increase their contestability. In this 
sense, intervention has provided the background and means for the elite to retrench without 
being substantially disturbed – indeed with the increased possibility of cementing their 
position within society more generally.  
 
This historical perspective finally also allows us to see that dissent in Mozambique is 
not necessarily suppressed for long. There was substantial discontent with the election 
results of 1999, which triggered opposition demonstrations. The recent social unrest 
triggered by rises in food (February 2008) and fuel prices (September 2009) in major cities 
has demonstrated that there is an increasing sense of dissatisfaction with the government. 
This took it very much by surprise, and the government is trying desperately to respond 
through appeals to its historic mission and to the value of ‘peace’ in establishing 
‘development’, thus re-articulating and re-asserting a longstanding rationale for government 
in Mozambique. Yet, it is unclear how long it will be able to maintain this under the present 
structures of power and wealth, which have sharpened inequality and centralisation in 
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